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ABSTRACT. Model-based systems engineering necessitates effective 
collaboration between different collaborators, teams, and stakeholders. 
Traditional approaches used for managing concurrent code-based 
development do not naturally extend to collaborative modeling, which 
implies novel challenges. We present a collaborative modeling framework 
that provides secure views with precisely defined model access to each 
collaborator by rule-based model-level access control policies. 
 
CHALLENGES 
The adoption of model-based systems engineering (MBSE) by system integrators (like 
airframers or car manufacturers) has been steadily increasing in the recent years [1]. 
MBSE enables to detect design flaws early and generate various artifacts (source code, 
configuration tables, etc.) automatically from high-quality system models. As a common 
industrial practice, system integrators frequently outsource the development of various 
components to subcontractors in an architecture-driven supply chain where the 
collaboration between cross-organizational teams is facilitated by sharing models stored 
in model repositories [2]. However, effective collaboration is hindered by numerous 
factors. 
 
Protection of intellectual property over heterogeneous teams. Cross-organizational collaboration 
introduces significant challenges for access control management to protect the respective 
Intellectual Property (IP) of different parties. For instance, the detailed internal design of a 
component needs to be revealed to certification authorities, but it needs to be hidden from 
competitors who might supply a different component in the system. Furthermore, certain 
critical aspects of the system model may only be modified by domain experts with 
appropriate qualifications. Due to the lack of support for cross-company collaboration in 
existing modeling repositories, very strict infrastructure-level security policies are in place 
at companies, which prevent effective collaboration.  
 
Model fragmentation and lack of fine-grained access control. In current industrial MBSE 
practice, system models are persisted in repositories such as (1) Version Control Systems 
(VCS), e.g. SVN or Git, (2) local database backends (e.g. in MetaEdit+ [3]), (3) dedicated 
object-based storages such as CDO (e.g. in Team for Capella), or (4) cloud-based solutions 
(e.g. NoMagic Teamwork Cloud).  
Unfortunately, access control management is still in a preliminary phase in these 
repositories as they support permission assignments only globally, or using fragments (i.e. 
on the level of files or projects). In order to share parts of system models between 
collaborators, models need to be split into a large number of static fragments (e.g. over 
1000 for automotive models). Consequently, the re-fragmentation of the model, which may 
be necessary when roles, policies or models evolve, is hard or infeasible. Therefore, static 
fragmentation becomes both a scalability and usability bottleneck. 
Static fragmentation can be mitigated by fine-grained access control where each model 
element may have its own set of permissions. Unfortunately, large industrial models may 
have millions of model elements, thus explicitly assigning permissions for each element 
would be labor-intensive and error-prone. Moreover, understanding and maintaining 
permissions after model changes can be problematic. 
 
Online and offline collaboration. System models are traditionally developed either in an offline 
or online manner. In offline collaboration, engineers check out an artifact from a repository 
into a local copy and commit local changes to the repository in asynchronous (long) 
transactions. In online collaboration, engineers may simultaneously edit a model in short 
synchronous transactions which are immediately propagated to all other users. This strategy 
is similar to online collaborative office tools like Google Docs, and it is showcased in 
modeling tools like WebGME [4], ATOMPM [5], GenMyModel [6] or MetaEdit+ [3].  
In case of access control restrictions, certain model changes should not be propagated to 
some collaborators while certain model modifications may be disallowed and rejected. In 
the offline case, all information available to a specific user needs to be provided as a self-
contained model that can be displayed and edited by existing off-the-shelf modeling tools. 
Hiding elements in a modeling tool is insufficient, as the IP is still accessible on the client 
side e.g. by file inspection. Hence, a filtered but modifiable model that excludes any 
confidential information needs to be sent to each client. Furthermore, the online scenario 
requires immediate change propagation where model modifications need to be evaluated in 
an efficient, reactive way in response to the change. 
 
Integration with existing techniques and tools. Effective access control for collaborative 
modeling should smoothly integrate with other collaboration practices such as version 
histories, user authentication, lock management (to temporarily prevent certain model 
edits) or conflict resolution by differencing and merging. While traditional VCS 
frameworks provide efficient support for handling text-based design artifacts, their model-
level counterparts require sophisticated techniques. Furthermore, the seamless integration of 
a collaboration layer with existing toolchains is a key industrial need.  
 
SECURE VIEWS FOR RULE-BASED MODEL-LEVEL ACCESS 
CONTROL 
To address these challenges, we have developed the MONDO COLLABORATION 
FRAMEWORK that enhances collaborative modeling repositories by providing secure views 
as an extra protection layer with rule-based model-level access control simultaneously 
enforced for both offline and online collaboration scenarios and adapted to software 
configuration management. 
 
Model-level Access Control Rules 
Security policies define access control rules that grant or deny read or write permissions 
over some assets (objects, attributes, references) for certain collaborators. Individual assets 
are read-only if write permissions are denied and they are hidden if read permissions are 
denied. Complex attribute-based access control strategies can be implemented by 
combining access control rules with graph queries. Graph queries provide an expressive 
declarative language (from the VIATRA [7, 8] open source project) to select which assets 
to restrict. Access control rules may reuse graph queries to define complex hierarchies and 
dependencies between individual assets based on the current state of the model.  
Access control rules are illustrated on a small example, extracted from the domain of 
offshore wind turbines [9] which was a case study of the MONDO Project [10]. A control 
unit is responsible for a certain type of physical device (e.g. pump, heater, fan). It may 
depend on multiple inputs (e.g. temperature) and produce multiple outputs (see metamodel 
in Figure 1, upper-left part). Each control unit requires special domain knowledge, thus a 
specialist called IOManager needs to oversee the inputs and outputs. 
The security policy (Figure 1, right part) provides access to non-confidential inputs and 
outputs only. By default, it denies access to any asset in the model. Here all access control 
rules use the same graph query objectIO (Figure 1, lower-left part) that selects all inputs and 
outputs and the value of their confidential attribute. Rule enableIO grants read and write 
permissions to all objects selected by graph query objectIO. Rule disableConfidentialAttr 
overrides this to make the confidential attribute of the same objects tamper-proof. Finally, 
rule disableConfidentialIO takes those inputs and outputs where the query returns true for 
isConfidential, and entirely hides them from subcontractors (members of the Externals 
group including IOManagers). Note that high-priority rules override lower-priority rules as 
well as the default permissions. 
 
FIGURE CAPTION. Figure 1. Sample access control policy 
 
Enforcing Access Control Rules in Secure Online and Offline Collaboration 
Our approach assumes the existence of a gold model that includes all information and IP, 
but it is not directly accessible to collaborators. Instead, access control rules are enforced by 
providing secure views (called front models) which contain only those model elements that 
are accessible to a specific collaborator. When collaborators modify their front models, the 
changes are propagated back to the gold model and then to other collaborators.  
Such synchronization between updatable secure views can conceptually be described by 
a lens [11], which is a pair of model transformations GET and PUTBACK. GET is 
responsible for read access control by filtering the gold model (hiding assets) into the front 
model according to read permissions. PUTBACK is responsible for checking modifications 
of the front model against write permissions and propagating them to the gold model if 
accepted.  
For secure offline collaboration [12] (Figure 2, upper part), each collaborator gets a 
dedicated front repository that contain the full version history of a front model. Similarly, a 
gold repository contains the version history of the gold model with complete information. 
Each collaborator continues to use an existing off-the-shelf client to access the front 
repository (but not the gold repository). Hence there is infrastructure-level protection 
against unauthorized model access. When a collaborator uploads some modifications to her 
front repository, these changes are propagated to the gold model by a PUTBACK operation. 
Then a new entry is added to version history of the gold repository, and all other front 
repositories are synchronized by GET operations where those changes are visible.  
For secure online collaboration, several users can join a shared modeling session (Figure 
2, lower part) to simultaneously display and edit the same model where changes are 
propagated immediately to other users. The gold model is loaded to server memory from 
the gold repository of the underlying (offline) repository. When a collaborator joins the 
session, a dedicated front model is derived from the gold model. Collaborators access their 
front model directly on the server (e.g. using a web browser), in contrast to the offline 
scenario, where users manipulate local copies of the models. As such, sensitive and 
restricted information is always kept on the servers, and it never reaches the modeling 
clients. Our lens transformations [13] operate in an incremental way: if a front model is 
modified, then the resulting PUTBACK and the subsequent GETs (propagating to other 
collaborators) act only on the changes. Therefore, after the initialization phase when the 
gold and front models are loaded into the memory, execution time is only proportional to 
the size of the changes and not to the size of the model. 
 
 
FIGURE CAPTION. Figure 2. Architecture of offline and online collaboration 
  
Secure Software Configuration Management 
Secure views can be directly used in industrial software configuration management (SCM) 
scenarios. 
 
Change requests. In SCM, changes may require the approval of multiple collaborators in 
model/code reviews. Without sufficient permissions to commit to gold, a proposer may 
create a change request. The request can be inspected for approval by other collaborators, 
and committed once it is signed off by one or more reviewers with jointly sufficient write 
privileges. 
Read access is enforced on change requests via GET before being shown to reviewers. 
However, as access control is attribute-based, this filtering can be manipulated, e.g. an 
attacker may propose changes in artifact ownership. Privilege escalation is averted as 
follows: first, a modified PUTBACK applies those proposed changes that are allowed with 
the joint write permissions of the proposer and the reviewer; then the merged result model 
is filtered by GET for the reviewer. This way, the secure view on the change request will 
only contain modifications that the reviewer can enact, or the proposer would be allowed to 
commit anyway. 
 
Collaboration workflows. In the industrial context, complex collaboration workflows along 
multiple branches (production, feature, etc.) are needed to co-evolve multiple versions of a 
system design for continuous engineering. Since access control rules use a graph query 
language for identifying assets, the scope of restrictions can be easily extended to support 
multiple branches. Domain-specific types defined by the metamodel are complemented 
with SCM-specific concepts like workspace, resource, branch, revision or tag, but no 
further adaptation is needed to the access control language. Thus one can specify access 
control policies where a collaborator is restricted to observe model versions on specific 
branches or created after certain revisions.  
 
Industrial applications. Together with the industrial partners of MONDO, we carried out a 
detailed scalability evaluation of the collaboration server with respect to increasing number 
of front repositories, increasing size of models or increasing change size (for the offline 
case) with promising results [9, 13, 12]. Further practical relevance stems from the fact that 
certain industrial products (like NoMagic Teamwork Cloud) have already adapted a mixed 
online and offline collaboration architecture, thus the concepts of secure views are directly 
applicable.  
While we promote graph queries to drive rule-based access control management for 
collaborative modeling, it is worth emphasizing that graph queries can also support other 
server-side tasks such as change impact analysis or automated conformance checks. 
Moreover, since lenses for checking access control rules can be wrapped into micro-
services (like Docker), we foresee the seamless adaptation and integration of secure views 
into existing product line management tools or future collaborative cloud-based model 
repositories. 
 
Limitations. Our collaboration server is currently integrated with Subversion (SVN) as 
requested by the industrial partners of MONDO European FP7 Project, where version 
history is managed in a standard SVN repository and users collaborate by using existing 
modeling tools and any SVN client. Integration with Git as underlying VCS technology is 
ongoing work. 
  
PRACTICAL BENEFITS 
Key benefits of our collaborative modeling framework for MBSE include the following:  
 
Collaboration of heterogeneous stakeholders: Our framework supports collaborative 
modeling between engineering teams of different companies (e.g. an integrator and its 
subcontractors) while protecting their intellectual property with the secure storage of the 
gold model.  
 
Extra layer of access control: Model-level fine-grained access control using secure views 
injects an extra layer of protection on top of existing protection offered by the 
underlying repository.  
 
Validation of access control policies: Access control rules support the consistent assignment 
and maintenance of permissions for large models and enable the systematic validation of 
access control policies (e.g. to ensure export control regulations or investigate a security 
breach). 
 
Compliance with SCM practices: Access control policies can be defined for modern SCM 
practices to collaborate along multiple branches, formal change request, etc.  
 
Smooth integration with existing tools: Our framework extends existing server-side 
repositories while keeping client-side modeling tools intact, thus engineers may continue 
using existing collaborative tools. 
 
As such, powerful existing collaboration practices used in software engineering can be 
complemented when collaborating over models. 
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